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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
PLATEAU MINING COMPANY 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-appellant Ernie Bruno (hereinafter "plain-
tiff") brings this action against his former employer Plateau 
Mining Company (hereinafter "Plateau") for wrongfully termin-
ating his employment. Plaintiff contends that Plateau's 
termination of his employment constitutes a breach of the 
employment contract between himself and Plateau. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court granted Plateau's motion for summary 
judgment, dismissing plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff began his employment with Plateau on 
October 6, 1975. (Bruno depo., p. 11.) At no time did 
plaintiff negotiate any terms of employment with Plateau, 
(id., Pp. 13-15, 41.) Plaintiff received no employment 
commitments of any kind from Plateau at his job interview. 
(Id., p. 14.) Plaintiff did not have a written contract of 
employment with Plateau. (id., p. 17.) Plaintiff was not 
given any assurances by Plateau that he would not be laid off. 
(id., p. 17.) Plateau operates a non-union mine without a 
collective bargaining agreement. (id,., p. 56.) 
On February 11, 1977, plaintiff signed a statement 
acknowledging receipt of the "Safety Guidelines and Rules 
Manual for Plateau Mining Company." (id., p. 41; Appendix I to 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 81.) 
The acknowledgment statement signed by plaintiff 
states: "I understand that knowledge of the contained rules 
and guidelines and observance of them is a requirement for 
employment by Plateau Mining Company." (Appendix I to Defen-
dant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 81.) 
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The "Safety Guidelines" manual states: 
OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES IS A 
REQUIREMENT TO EMPLOYMENT WITH PLATEAU 
MINING COMPANY. IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO 
OBSERVE THEM YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO REPRI-
MAND, SUSPENSION OR POSSIBLE TERMINATION. 
(Appendix II to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R. 85.) 
No person shall participate in fighting or 
horseplay on company property. 
(Id., p. 3, R. 85.) 
This manual is not intended to cover all 
situations. 
(Id., p. 1, R. 84.) 
Plateau Mining Company reserves the right to 
add to, delete from, or modify the preceeding 
[sic] guidelines and rules as they [sic] 
deem necessary. 
(Id., p. 10, R. 89.) 
Plateau did not post or circulate to employees any 
bulletins concerning an alleged policy on fighting or on 
employee terminations. (Bruno depo., pp. 57-58, 61.) 
Plaintiff admits that it is not safe to fight on 
mining property, whether underground or on the surface. (Bruno 
depo., p. 53.) On Thursday, December 8, 1983, plaintiff had a 
fight with another Plateau employee during plaintiff's after-
noon work shift. (Id., p. 23.) Prior to this fight, plaintiff 
had fought with another Plateau employee at work. (Id., p. 22.) 
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On Monday, December 12, 1983, plaintiff's first day of 
work after a three-day weekend. Plateau management informed 
plaintiff that it would likely fire him. (Id., pp. 23, 
25-26.) On December 12, 1983, plaintiff chose to resign and 
submitted a signed letter of resignation. (Id./ p. 27; 
Appendix III to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R. 91.) Plaintiff understands that 
Plateau had the right to terminate his employment. (Bruno 
depo. p. 42.) 
Plateau moved the lower court for summary judgment in 
its favor and supported its motion with an accompanying memo-
randum. The lower court granted Plateau's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the basis of Plateau's Memorandum and in the 
absence of any objection by plaintiff to Plateau's Motion. 
(Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 104-105.) At 
plaintiff's request, the lower court then delayed entry of 
judgment to allow plaintiff additional time in which to submit 
an opposing memorandum and affidavits. Plaintiff did so. 
Plateau moved to strike portions of the two affidavits submit-
ted by plaintiff on the ground that they did not comply with 
the requirements of Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Motion to Strike, R. 136.) The lower court 
granted Plateau's Motion to Strike and its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dismissing plaintiff's claim with prejudice. (Ruling 
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on Motion to Reconsider Summary Judgment, R. 157.) Plaintiff 
appealed from the lower court's Order Granting Summary Judgment 
in favor of Plateau. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN STRIKING 
PORTIONS OF TWO AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY 
PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVITS DID NOT 
COMPLY WITH RULE 56(e). 
The lower court properly struck from the record 
portions of the two affidavits submitted by plaintiff because 
they did not set forth specific facts, were not based on 
personal knowledge, did not present admissible evidence and did 
not show affirmatively that affiants were competent to testify 
as to the matters contained in the paragraphs stricken. 
Further, a portion of the affidavit of plaintiff contradicted 
his deposition testimony. Thus, the two affidavits did not 
comply with Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLATEAU 
BECAUSE, AS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE, PLAINTIFF 
CAN HAVE NO BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM ON THE 
BASIS OF HIS TERMINATION. 
The lower court did not err in granting summary judg-
ment in favor of Plateau, even if portions of the affidavits 
-5-
were improperly stricken. It is undisputed that plaintiff was 
hired under an oral contract of indefinite duration. Neither 
Plateau nor plaintiff acted subsequently to alter plaintiffs 
at-will employment status. Plaintiffs allegations that 
Plateau had a Mcourse of dealing" policy prohibiting Plateau 
from terminating an employee for fighting and that the alleged 
policy was part of plaintiffs employment contract are com-
pletely without support in the record (including the affi-
davits). In fact, plaintiff signed a statement acknowledging 
Plateau's right to terminate him for fighting. In sum, plain-
tiff can point to no facts indicating that plaintiff and 
Plateau altered plaintiffs oral, at-will employment contract 
with Plateau. Because plaintiff was employed by Plateau under 
an oral contract of indefinite duration, the lower court 
properly dismissed his breach of contract claim based upon his 
termination. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY STRUCK POR-
TIONS OF THE TWO AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED 
BY PLAINTIFF BECAUSE THEY DO NOT COMPLY 
WITH RULE 56(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that affidavits (1) Mbe made on personal knowledge", 
(2) Hset forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence," 
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and (3) -show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein.- Further, Rule 56(e) 
requires a party opposing a motion for summary judgment to "set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit of Vopel Landers 
and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the affidavit of plaintiff do not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 56(e). 
Paragraph 3 of the Landers affidavit states that 
-approximately twenty (20) individuals [were] involved in 
fights,- and that -approximately ten (10) of these [individ-
uals? fights?] were underground.- Paragraph 4 states that -no 
personnel actions were taken regarding these incidents." 
Affiant Landers does not identify the individuals referred to 
and does not identify the time or place at which the alleged 
incidents occurred. Affiant Landers also provides no basis for 
his alleged knowledge of the incidents or his allegation that 
no personnel action was taken in response to the incidents. 
Paragraph 9 of the Bruno affidavit states, inter alia, 
that -affiant is aware of approximately thirty (30) individuals 
involved in fights approximately forty percent (40%) of which 
occurred underground.- Paragraph 10 states, inter alia, that 
-supervisors were aware of these incidents- and that "no 
personnel action was taken regarding these incidents.- Affiant 
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Bruno does not identify any of the individuals referred to and 
does not specify the time and place at which the incidents 
allegedly occurred. Affiant Bruno also provides no evidentiary 
basis for his alleged knowledge of the incidents or his alleged 
knowledge of Plateau's awareness of them or Plateau's response 
to them. 
The two affidavits fail to comply with Rule 56(e) in 
that neither of them show affirmatively that the affiants are 
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein. Nothing 
in the affidavits suggests that affiants have personal know-
ledge of the matters referred to or that their statements are 
anything but inadmissible hearsay. The fact that the affiants 
were employees of Plateau does not by itself demonstrate that 
either of them is competent to testify as to incidents involv-
ing other employees. Further, since neither affiant was, or 
claims to have been, a supervisor, manager or personnel 
employee, they have no basis on which to assert personal know-
ledge of personnel actions taken by Plateau in regard to other 
employees. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that the affiants failed to 
show affirmatively that they are competent to testify as to 
statements made in their affidavits. Instead, plaintiff argues 
that there is "nothing in the record indicating a lack of 
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competency by the plaintiff [and Landers] to testify" as to the 
matters in their affidavits. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
pp. 6, 7.) In so arguing, plaintiff misconstrues the require-
ments of Rule 56(e) and admits implicitly that the affidavits 
fail to comply with the rule. 
The stricken paragraphs of the two affidavits set 
forth no "specific facts" as required by Rule 56(e), but only 
conclusory opinions and allegations. There is nothing specific 
about affiants* claims that an "approximate" number of unnamed 
individuals were involved in fights at unknown times and 
locations. Because the affidavits fail to state who was 
involved in the alleged "incidents," when they occurred or 
where they took place, and because they even fail to describe 
the "incidents" themselves, Plateau has no basis on which to 
evaluate, dispute or counter affiants' allegations and the 
court has no evidence by which to determine if any material 
Affiant Bruno states that "at least two (2) of these 
fights occurred underground at the face which is the area where 
coal is being mined". (Bruno Affidavit 1f 10.) This statement 
adds very little specificity to plaintiffs affidavit in that 
the time and individuals involved are not identified and even 
the number of incidents is imprecise. In any case, plaintiff 
provides no information whatsoever concerning the remaining 28 
alleged incidents. 
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facts are in dispute. Likewise, affiants' claims that no 
personnel actions were taken in response to the alleged 
incidents are neither specific nor factual in character. They 
are simply groundless accusations. In sum, neither affidavit 
sets forth specific facts nor provides any evidentiary basis 
for affiants* allegations. 
Because the affidavits neither set forth specific 
facts nor provide supporting evidentiary facts for affiants' 
allegations, the portions of the affidavits were properly 
stricken from the record as not in compliance with Rule 56(e). 
See, e.g. , Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) 
(affiants must set forth admissible facts; statements which are 
nonspecific and largely conclusory in form are not admissible); 
Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1980) (affidavit 
insufficient to withstand motion for summary judgment where it 
does not identify "specific evidentiary facts"). 
2In his deposition, which took place three months prior 
to his affidavit, plaintiff was repeatedly asked about his 
alleged knowledge of other employees involved in fights on 
Plateau property. Plaintiff was unable to provide precise or 
detailed information about the alleged incidents of fighting. 
Moreover, plaintiff did not indicate that he had personal 
knowledge of any of the alleged fighting incidents. (Bruno 
depo., pp. 45-53.) In spite of having three months in which to 
present specific facts in support of his allegations, plain-
tiff, in his affidavit, continues to offer no evidentiary facts 
to substantiate his claims. 
-10-
The affidavits also fail to comply with Rule 56(e) in 
that neither affiant states that the statements contained in 
his affidavit are based on personal knowledge. Rather, each 
affiant claims only that his statements are "true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge, information and belief." (Affi-
davit of Vopel Landers, p. 2, R. 130; Affidavit of Plaintiff, 
Ernie Bruno, p.3, R. 134.) Additionally, affiants state that 
some unidentified "matters [are] alleged upon information and 
belief." Id. Since both affiants admit that their statements 
are based, in whole or in part, on information and belief, and 
since neither affiant claims to have personal knowledge of the 
matters contained in his affidavit and does not indicate how he 
might have such personal knowledge, the lower court properly 
struck portions of the affidavits from the record. See, e.g. , 
Treloqqan v. Treloqqan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (M[A]n 
affidavit [based] on information and belief is insufficient to 
provoke a genuine issue of fact."); Pentecost v. Harward, 699 
P.2d 696, 698 (Utah 1985) (Rule 56(e) not complied with where 
"information and/or belief" as well as personal knowledge is 
offered as a basis for statements made); Walker v. Rocky 
Mountain Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973)(state-
ments based on information and belief must be disregarded). 
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Both affiants' lack of personal knowledge is shown by 
the vagueness of their accusations and the absence of specific 
evidentiary facts in support of them. Both affiants ref^r only 
to "approximate" numbers of individuals and/or incidents; 
affian4- Bruno claims only to be HawareM of such approximations, 
(Bruno affidavit, 1f 9, R. 133.) Plaintiff's lack of personal 
knowledge of the matters contained in his affidavit is also 
indicated by his deposition testimony. In his deposition, 
plaintiff did not testify that he had personal knowledge of any 
employees involved in fighting on Plateau property. Instead, 
he indicated only indirect knowledge cf the names of employees 
allegedly involved in fights. (Bruno depo., pp. 48, 49-52.) 
When asked how he acquired a list of 20 names of employees 
allegedly involved in fighting, plaintiff testified: 
Oh, well, through -ny time being there I know 
who's been in fight, and who's not, and then 
I've had other individuals from the mine or 
whatever who I've as>e3 that have been in 
fights on their crews to give me the infor-
mation, and they have. 
(Id., p. 49.) 
Plaintiff's deposition not only indicates that his 
alleged knowledge is not the result of first-hand observation, 
but also shows that his affidavit contr:dicts his deposition 
testimony. In his deposition, plaintiff claimed only to be 
aware of "roughly 20" persons involved in fights (Id., p. 50.), 
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not the "approximately thirty (30) individuals- he states in 
his affidavit. (Bruno affidavit, If 9, R. 133.) Because 
plaintiff's affidavit contradicts his deposition testimony, 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of plaintiff's affidavit were properly 
stricken from the record. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 
1172-73 Utah 1983) (a party may not rely on a subsequent 
affidavit contradicting his deposition to create an issue of 
fact on a motion for summary judgment). 
Plaintiff argues that he "should not be penalized" for 
stating that hib affidavit was based on information and 
belief. (Brief of Ilaintiff-Appellant, p. 7.) The issue is 
not one of a penalty, tmt one of plaintiff's improperly asking 
the lower court to make a decision in his favor on the basis of 
unsupported allegations. Since a principal purpose of summary 
judgment is to determine "whether genuine issues exist as to 
material facts" (Leininoer v Stearns-Roger Manufacturing 
Company, 17 Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d .**, 38 (1965)), summary judg-
ment would be a pointless and ineffe tive exercise if plaintiff 
were permitted to create an issue oi fact on the basis of 
allegations resting on information and belief. Because the two 
affidavits submitted by plaintiff contain m tters not based on 
personal knowledge, the lower court properly struck them from 
the record. 
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In sum/ the affidavits were properly stricken from the 
record by the lower court because they are not based on 
personal knowledge/ but on information and belief/ do not set 
forth specific facts admissible in evidence but only general, 
conclusory allegations and opinions/ and do not show affirm-
atively that affiants are competent to testify as to the 
matters in their affidavits. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
BY THE LOWER COURT BECAUSE PLAINTIFF 
WAS AN AT-WILL EMPLOYEE HIRED ON THE 
BASIS OF AN ORAL CONTRACT OF INDEFINITE 
DURATION AND BECAUSE NO SUBSEQUENT 
CONDUCT BY THE PARTIES ALTERED PLAIN-
TIFF'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH PLATEAU. 
A. Plaintiff's employment was terminable at will because 
plaintiff was hired on the basis of an oral contract of indef-
inite duration. 
Plaintiff alleges that Plateau breached the employment 
contract between itself and plaintiff by terminating his 
employment. (Complaint/ If 1, R. 2.) Plaintiff/ however, has 
no valid breach of employment contract claim because he was 
hired on the basis of an oral contract of indefinite duration. 
See Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979) ("When 
an individual is hired for an indefinite time, he has no right 
of action against his employer for breach of the employment 
contract upon being discharged."). A breach of employment 
contract claim may arise on the basis of termination only if 
(1) the employment contract stipulates the duration of 
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employment or (2) the employee provides good consideration in 
addition to the services he contracts to perform. Ifl.; Rose v. 
Allied Development Co., 34 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1986) (reaf-
firming Bihlmaier). Plaintiff does not allege that he provided 
additional consideration, and it is undisputed that plaintiff 
was hired on the basis of a contract of indefinite duration. 
Among the material facts presented by Plateau to the 
lower court which plaintiff did not controvert are the follow-
ing: (1) plaintiff did not negotiate any terms of employment 
with Plateau; (2) plaintiff received no employment commitments 
of any kind from Plateau at his job interview; (3) plaintiff 
was not given any assurances by Plateau that he would not be 
laid off; (4) plaintiff did not have a written contract of 
employment with Plateau; (5) Plateau operates a non-union mine 
without a collective bargaining agreement; (6) Plaintiff under-
stands that Plateau had the right to terminate his employment. 
(Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Material Facts, 1Hf 2-6, 15, R. 64-65, 66.) Because 
plaintiff does not controvert the above material facts, these 
facts are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment. 
See Rule 2.8(e), Rules of Practice in the District Courts and 
Circuit Courts in the State of Utah ("All material facts set 
forth in the statement of the movant shall be deemed 
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admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specif-
ically controverted by the statement of the opposing party."). 
On the basis of the above undisputed facts, it is 
clear that plaintiff was hired on the basis of an oral contract 
of indefinite duration. Consequently, the lower court properly 
granted Plateau's motion for summary judgment and dismissed 
with prejudice plaintiff's breach of employment contract suit. 
B. No subsequent actions by plaintiff and Plateau altered 
plaintiff's at-will employment relationship with Plateau. 
Because it is undisputed that plaintiff was hired on 
the basis of a contract of indefinite duration, plaintiff could 
have a cognizable breach of contract claim only if subsequent 
conduct by the parties to the contract transformed the contract 
into a contract for a definite term. (Rose v. Allied Develop-
ment Co., supra, 34 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.) There is no 
evidence in the record (including the affidavits submitted by 
plaintiff) indicating that Plateau and plaintiff altered the 
employment contract between them so as to make it one for a 
definite term. Indeed, the only subsequent action even 
remotely related to plaintiff's employment contract was plain-
tiff's acknowledgement that he could be discharged for 
fighting. While plaintiff's acknowledgement imposed no duties 
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on Plateau, it did put plaintiff on notice that he would put 
his continued employment at risk by fighting. 
Subsequent to plaintiff's hiring, Plateau distributed 
to its employees a safety booklet entitled "Safety Guide-
3 
lines." (Appendix II to Defendant's Memorandum in Support 
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 83.) Plaintiff 
acknowledged his receipt of the safety manual by signing a 
statement which stated in part: "I understand that knowledge of 
the contained rules and guidelines and observance of them is a 
requirement for employment by Plateau Mining Company." 
(Appendix I to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R. 81.) The safety manual states: 
OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES IS A 
REQUIREMENT TO EMPLOYMENT WITH PLATEAU MIN-
ING COMPANY. IF YOU CHOOSE NOT TO OBSERVE 
THEM, YOU WILL BE SUBJECT TO REPRIMAND, 
SUSPENSION OR POSSIBLE TERMINATION. (Appen-
dix II, p. 3, R. 85) 
No person shall participate in fighting or 
horseplay on company property. (id./ R. 85) 
This manual is not intended to cover all 
situations. (id., p. 1, R. 84) 
Plateau Mining Company reserves the right to 
add to, delete from, or modify the preceed-
ing [sic] guidelines and rules as they [sic] 
deem necessary. (id., p. 10, R. 10) 
3This safety booklet is also referred to as "Safety 
Guidelines and Rules Manual for Plateau Mining Company." See 
Appendix I to Defendant's Memorandum In Support Of Its Motion 
For Summary Judgment, R. 81. 
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The safety manual shows that Plateau would not count-
enance fighting in its operations, and that it might terminate 
an employee reckless enough to fight in the mines. Fighting is 
particularly dangerous in a coal mine, especially underground, 
where it may contribute to serious accidents and injuries. In 
light of the many hazards inherent in coal mining, Plateau 
included fighting among prohibited actions so as to secure the 
health and safety of its employees. (Id., pp. 1-3, R. 85) An 
employee knocked unconscious underground could not escape in 
the event of a fire, a bounce, or a cave-in. 
Plaintiffs signed acknowledgement establishes that he 
was aware of Plateau's safety guidelines and agreed to comply 
with them. On two separate occasions, plaintiff was involved 
in fights with other employees, and following the second fight-
ing incident, plaintiff was terminated. Consequently, nothing 
in Plateau's safety guidelines or in its action terminating 
plaintiffs employment provides any support for plaintiffs 
breach of employment contract claim. 
Plateau's safety guidelines booklet was not part of 
plaintiffs employment contract because its publication and 
distribution was an unilateral action by Plateau concerning 
safety only, was not bargained for by plaintiff or any other 
employee, and involved no meeting of the minds as to new or 
different terms of employment. 
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Even if the safety booklet were construed as part of 
plaintiff's employment contract, it would still not provide any 
basis for plaintiff's breach of employment contract claim. The 
safety booklet did not alter plaintiff's at-will employment 
status because the safety booklet neither provided employment 
for a definite term nor limited Plateau's right to terminate 
plaintiff for any reason or no reason at all. The safety 
booklet only stated that employees were subject to disciplinary 
action if they did not observe Plateau's safety requirements. 
Moreover, plaintiff clearly violated Plateau's safety guide-
lines by twice fighting with other employees on company 
property. In sum, whether or not Plateau's safety booklet is 
treated as part of plaintiff's employment contract, plaintiff 
does not have a valid breach of contract claim because plain-
tiff's employment was terminable at will and because plaintiff 
violated plateau's safety guidelines which he agreed to observe. 
Plaintiff alleges that, contrary to its written safety 
guidelines, Plateau had a "policy" which prohibited it from 
terminating an employee for fighting. Plateau, according to 
plaintiff, followed a "course of dealing" of not terminating 
employees for fighting. (Memorandum & Affidavit in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 4, 6, R. 126, 
127.) Plaintiff further argues that this "course of dealing" 
constituted a company policy which was part of plaintiff's 
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contract of employment. (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 3.) 
This "course of dealing" allegedly constituted a company policy 
and a provision of plaintiff's employment contract prohibiting 
Plateau from imposing more than "a maximum of three (3) day 
4 
suspension for an employee fighting for the first time." 
(Memorandum & Affidavit in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
4Since plaintiff admits that he was involved in a 
fighting incident with another employee prior to the fight 
which occasioned his termination, plaintiff's termination was 
proper even under plaintiff's alleged policy. Regarding the 
first fighting incident, plaintiff testified: 
Q: It's true, is it not, Mr. Bruno, that your altercation 
with Mr. Stoker [the second fighting incident] was not 
the first time that you had slapped someone around in 
Plateau's mine? 
A: No, that is not true. 
Q: You never slapped Mr. Mead in the showers? 
A: No. 
Q: Never hit Mr. Mead? 
A: No. 
Q: If Mr. Mead says that you hit him, would he be lying? 
A: Oh, yes, I did push him, but I never did strike the 
man. 
Q: If Mr. Mead were to testify that you approached him in 
a threatening manner, would he be lying? 
A: Well, I pushed the individual. 
(Bruno depo., p. 22.) In his affidavit, plaintiff does not 
deny that the first fight occurred, but only states that Mr. 
Mead did not file a complaint about it. (Bruno affidavit, It 11, 
R. 133) 
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Summary Judgment, p. 1, R. 122 (emphasis added); see also 
Complaint, 1[ 6, R. 2.) There is no evidence in the record, 
including the affidavits submitted by plaintiff, supporting any 
of plaintiffs claims. 
There is no evidence of any "course of dealing" 
constituting a company policy which prohibited Plateau from 
5 
terminating plaintiff for fighting. The affidavits 
submitted by plaintiff, at most, suggest that some employees 
were not terminated for fighting. Such "evidence" does not 
establish that Plateau had a policy which prevented it from 
terminating employees for fighting. It does not follow from 
the fact that some employees may not have been terminated for 
fighting that the employer can never terminate an employee for 
fighting. In any case, Plateau's safety guidelines booklet 
does not state that an employee must in every case be termin-
ated for fighting. Rather, it only states that employees who 
do not observe the safety rules "will be subject to" 
5Plaintiff mistakenly claims that Plateau provides no 
support for its position that the alleged policy as described 
by plaintiff was never a policy of Plateau. (Brief of Plain-
tiff - Appellant, p.4.) Plateau's position is supported by its 
written rule on fighting contained in its safety booklet, 
Appendix II, p.3, to Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 85. 
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disciplinary action, ranging from "reprimand" to "possible 
termination". (Appendix II to Defendant's Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R. 85.) 
Because Plateau's written safety guidelines permit it to 
respond to incidents of fighting with a full range of options, 
based on the results of management's investigation of the inci-
dent, the affidavits do not establish any contradiction between 
Plateau's conduct and its written safety guidelines. In sum, 
nothing contained in the affidavits submitted by plaintiff 
establishes any conduct inconsistent with that provided for in 
the written safety booklet. Further, nothing contained in the 
affidavits establishes a "company policy" prohibiting Plateau 
from ever terminating an employee for fighting. 
There is no basis in the record (including the affi-
davits submitted by plaintiff) for plaintiff's assertion that 
the alleged "course of dealing" policy was incorporated into 
plaintiff's contract of employment. At no point, either in his 
memorandum to the lower court or in his brief to this Court, 
does plaintiff offer a single piece of evidence or a single 
argument in support of his claim that the alleged "course of 
dealing" was part of his contract of employment. Since plain-
tiff was hired on the basis of an oral contract of indefinite 
duration, plaintiff must provide some evidence that the alleged 
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"course of dealing" transformed plaintiff's contract into one 
of definite duration. Plaintiff provides neither evidence nor 
argument for such a view. 
Because plaintiff was originally hired under a con-
tract of indefinite duration, any alteration of plaintiffs 
employment contract can only occur on a basis of a new "under-
standing" , whether express or implicit, between the two 
contracting parties. Rose v. Allied Development, supra, 34 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. Consequently, a transformation of plain-
tiffs at-will employment contract into a contract for a 
definite term cannot be established on the basis of plaintiffs 
subjective understanding or expectations alone. Id. ("tT]he 
existence of an employment agreement not terminable at will 
must be established by more than subjective understandings or 
expectations."). Likewise, no transformation of plaintiffs 
at-will employment contract can be established without evidence 
that Plateau's understanding paralleled plaintiffs. Id. 
There is no evidence in the record that Plateau understood any 
alleged "course of dealing" regarding fighting to transform its 
at-will contract with plaintiff into one of definite duration. 
Finally, no transformation of plaintiffs at-will employment 
contract into one of definite duration can be established with-
out evidence that Plateau intended to forfeit its right to 
terminate plaintiff at will. id. There is no evidence in the 
record of such an intention by Plateau. 
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In short, regardless of plaintiff's claims concerning 
the existence of an alleged "course of dealing," there is no 
evidence in the record for plaintiff's claim that the "course 
of dealing" was incorporated into plaintiff's at-will employ-
ment contract with Plateau so as to transform it into one for a 
definite term. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence in the record (including the 
affidavits submitted by plaintiff) to support plaintiff's claim 
that Plateau breached its employment contract with plaintiff by 
terminating his employment. Plaintiff does not dispute that he 
was hired on the basis of an oral contract of indefinite dura-
tion. Plaintiff offers no evidence of any subsequent agreement 
between Plateau and the plaintiff transforming his at-will 
employment contract into a contract for a definite term. The 
affidavits submitted by plaintiff do not support plaintiffs 
claim that Plateau had a policy which prohibited it from term-
inating an employee for fighting. Further, the affidavits do 
not establish that any alleged "course of dealing" was incorpo-
rated into plaintiff's employment contract so as to transform 
it into a contract for a definite term. In sum, the record 
establishes that plaintiff was hired and remained employed 
under an oral contract of indefinite duration, which was term-
inable at will. 
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Because plaintiff offers no evidence in support of his 
allegations, summary judgment was properly granted by the lower 
court. See Webster v. Sill, supra, 675 P.2d at 1172 ("The mere 
assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper eviden-
tiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion."); 
Leininger v. Stearns-Roqer Manufacturing Company, supra, 404 
P.2d at 38 (M[T]he whole purpose of summary judgment would be 
defeated if a case could be forced to trial by a mere assertion 
that an issue exists."). 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the lower court's 
order of summary judgment in favor of Plateau should be 
affirmed. 
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